Shipping Shift: Vessels Near Strait of Hormuz Broadcast False Nationalities to Deter Strikes
Between June 12 and June 24, maritime analytics firm Windward recorded 55 vessels near the Strait of Hormuz and in the Red Sea transmitting 101 atypical Automatic Identification System (AIS) messages purporting false national identities such as “China owned”, “Russian crude” or “no link Israel”. Once primarily seen in the Red Sea during the Houthi campaigns, the tactic has now extended into the Persian Gulf in direct response to heightened tensions following Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iranian facilities earlier this month.
Windward CEO Ami Daniel explained that shipping companies deliberately issue misleading AIS broadcasts because global shipping ownership is complex, making it hard to trace actual nationality. By claiming affiliation with countries considered less threatened, such as China or Russia, ships hope to avoid targeting compared to vessels associated with the United States, the United Kingdom or Israel.
On June 24, the day after the U.S.-brokered ceasefire, the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) reported a notable 30 percent surge in commercial shipping traffic in the region—a sign that operators are quickly resuming routes amid continued insecurity. This shift comes as the Strait of Hormuz remains a crucial chokepoint, transporting roughly 20 percent of global oil and fuel consumption.
Specific examples of these false broadcasts include the Panama-flagged container ship Yuan Xiang Fa Zhan, which transmitted “PKKHI all Chinese” while crossing the Strait, and the China-flagged supertanker Yuan Yang Hu, which displayed “Chinese ship” until clearing the strait, then switched to “CN NBG”, referencing its destination at Ningbo-Zhoushan. Likewise, in the Red Sea, the Singapore-flagged container vessel Kota Cabar signaled “Vsl no link Israel”.
Compounding the problem, recent incidents of electronic interference—including GNSS jamming and AIS signal spoofing—have become more frequent. Windward has reported anomalies in roughly 970 vessels per day experiencing GPS disruption in the Gulf region, contributing to navigational errors and even collisions, such as those involving the tankers Front Tyne and Front Eagle south of the Strait.
To mitigate risk, many shipping companies are actively rerouting vessels. Some tankers are executing U-turns, zig-zags, or pauses outside the Strait, while commercial operators such as Japan’s Nippon Yusen and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines have instructed their vessels to reduce time spent in the Gulf and transit solely closer to Omani waters. QatarEnergy has delayed tanker entry into the Strait until just before loading, and Greek authorities are advising ships to avoid Iranian waters altogether.
This marked shift in maritime behavior reflects how elevated geopolitical tension and electronic risks are reshaping global shipping. When vessels falsely claim safer national identities, deliberately alter routes or struggle with navigation interference, the outcome reverberates across maritime security and the stability of global oil markets. Close monitoring of AIS signals and GPS integrity has become essential in maintaining safe and efficient maritime operations in one of the world’s most sensitive shipping corridors.
